tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post3518722435602879164..comments2024-01-23T17:14:04.067-05:00Comments on Jaltcoh: Keeping an open mind on the mind-body problem, part 3John Althouse Cohenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11703450281424023177noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post-79009921313016232532009-02-27T05:12:00.000-05:002009-02-27T05:12:00.000-05:00Have followed your link and learned quite a bit (t...Have followed your link and learned quite a bit (thanks!). I don't think that the position I sketched in the first post is best described as interactionist; rather, it seems to me it is best described as <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism" REL="nofollow">epiphenominalism</A> (which also is a form of dualism; I stand corrected). I wonder, though, whether some of the people I referred to above would not prefer <A HREF="http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc" REL="nofollow">biological naturalism</A> if pressed.LemmusLemmushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00917054221547240969noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post-9926481488905682982009-02-26T18:22:00.000-05:002009-02-26T18:22:00.000-05:00You're mistaken. Materialism means only the physic...You're mistaken. Materialism means only the physical exists. Dualism means there are mental states in addition to physical states (though they may be just different properties of the same thing). <BR/><BR/>It's about what kinds of things exist, not about whether they have causal effects on each other. <BR/><BR/>You're right that someone who believes in the existence of consciousness disconnected from any brain activity would also be a dualist (assuming they believe there are also physical things in the world). But that's not the <I>only</I> kind of dualist. You're simply dismissing the existence of <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation" REL="nofollow">interactionist dualists</A>.John Althouse Cohenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11703450281424023177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post-22391727650626809992009-02-26T16:36:00.000-05:002009-02-26T16:36:00.000-05:00I'd put the bit you quoted in the materialist camp...I'd put the bit you quoted in the materialist camp - but that's pointless haggling over definitions. (Belief in consciousness without brain activity would be clearly dualistic.)<BR/><BR/>I was referring in particular to two books by German neuroscientist Gerhard Roth, but according to Amazon, they haven't been translated into English (although there is <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/Voluntary-Action-Interface-Culture-Psychology/dp/019857228X/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1235683535&sr=1-3" REL="nofollow">this</A> and <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/Brain-Evolution-Cognition-Gerhard-Roth/dp/0471331708/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1235683535&sr=1-4" REL="nofollow">this</A>). Shame, good books.LemmusLemmushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00917054221547240969noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post-33666986447203893202009-02-26T09:36:00.000-05:002009-02-26T09:36:00.000-05:00not itself made of physical matter but that the ex...<I>not itself made of physical matter but that the experience of consciousness/self/whathaveyou emerges as a result of physical processes. What is obvious is that many alterations of subjective experience can be explained as a result of changes in brain chemistry (e.g., drinking alcohol)</I><BR/><BR/>If that's correct -- that is, if it's true that our mental states are <I>not "made of </I>physical matter" but are merely "<I>result[s]</I> of changes in brain chemistry," then that suggests that materialism is incorrect, and Nagel is on the right track. <BR/><BR/>Nagel isn't doubting that things that happen in the brain cause things to happen in the mind. For instance, I'm pretty sure he doesn't believe in an afterlife and believes that when someone dies, the cessation of brain activity causes the end of all mental activity. He's just disagreeing with those who say that there <I>is nothing</I> distinctly mental in contrast with the physical brain, whether it be a distinct substance or even a distinct property.John Althouse Cohenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11703450281424023177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4464222071440015933.post-41668201580391781552009-02-25T18:59:00.000-05:002009-02-25T18:59:00.000-05:00Two quick points late at night; maybe more later:T...Two quick points late at night; maybe more later:<BR/><BR/>The validity of your point 4 seems to depend heavily on how exactly the two italicized words are defined.<BR/><BR/>On point 6 in particular: I thought the party line among neurologists who have tackled these issues was that what we experience as our minds/consciousness/self was not itself made of physical matter but that the experience of consciousness/self/whathaveyou emerges as a result of physical processes. What is obvious is that many alterations of subjective experience can be explained as a result of changes in brain chemistry (e.g., drinking alcohol).LemmusLemmushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00917054221547240969noreply@blogger.com